SPLINTERED SOLIDARITY HAS PUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN A SPIN

破裂的团结导致全球管理陷于困境

By Philip Stephens

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033450/en

Whatever happened to global governance. The Group of 20 was supposed to answer the question of our times – how do rich and rising nations manage competing and coincident interests in an interdependent world? The best that the G20 leaders could come up with the other day was polite agreement to disagree.

无论全球管理发生了什么事情，人们期望20国集团回答我们这个时代的问题：富裕国家与正在富裕的国家如何在这个联系日益紧密的世界中管理竞争与利益 的合作？20国集团的领导人所能做的最好的事情也就是某天聚集在一起，然后礼貌的一致表达他们的互不一致。

Heady talk of a new international architecture stirred by last year's London G20 gathering is long behind us. There have since been three big global challenges on the agenda – about the shape of the financial system and the path of economic recovery, about climate change and about trade.

去年在伦敦20国集团聚会上，成立一个令人激动的新国际架构的讨论远远落后于（我们的期待）了。自那以后，议事日程上还有三个全球性的挑战——金融 系统的重塑与经济复苏的方法，气候变化，以及全球贸易。

On the first, as we saw at the weekend G20 gathering in Toronto, governments are mostly going their own ways, albeit with elements of bilateral co-operation. Barack Obama, I heard this week in Washington, thought the summit pretty much a waste of time.

首先，正如我们所看到的，在多伦多这个周末的G20会议上，尽管有着双边协议的基础，各国领导人还是自说自话。这周在华盛顿，我听说奥巴马认为这个 的高层会议纯粹是浪费时间。

Progress on climate change has largely stalled since the half-failure (or half-success, according to taste) of the Copenhagen summit. As for trade, the rich nations have abandoned hope of concluding the Doha round in favour of new bilateral and regional deals.

自从哥本哈根高层会议上气候变化的议题半失败（根据不同的口味，也可以说半成功）以后，谈判进程已经基本停了下来。而在贸易问题上，发达国家已经放 弃了在多哈回合的基础上达成的新的双边和地区协议的希望。

The financial crisis saw unity forged in adversity. Political leaders vowed to wrest back command of their destinies from out-of-control markets. Co-ordinated growth strategies merged national with mutual interests.

金融危机促使各国在艰难时事下协调一致。政治领导人发誓将他们的命运从失控的市场中挽救回来。合作增长的战略将国民利益与共同利益结合起来了。

Europeans boasted that if the US, China and others wanted an example of how interdependence could be made to work to shared advantage they need look no further than the European Union. Europe's unique experiment in shared sovereignty provided a model for a global settlement.

欧洲人自夸说，如果美国、中国和其他国家想看到在共享利益的基础上的相互信赖是如何建立的实例，他们不必往远处看，只要看看欧盟就知道了。欧洲在分 享主权的基础上的联合试验为一个全球性的协议的建立提供了一个模式。

And now. The crisis has passed, and with it the imperative to co-operate and co-ordinate. Politics has turned local again. For all the grandiose talk of curbing the excesses of laisser faire capitalism, the markets remain the masters. The banks have got off lightly, the bankers are still picking up their bonuses, and the bond markets are calling the economic shots.

现在，随着危机的过去，最重要的合作与协同也一并逝去。国内政治议题开始提升。在所有的关于自由放任资本主义的浮夸的批评之后，市场重新成为了主导 力量。银行轻松的下了车（译注：逃脱了惩罚），银行家们依然获得高额奖金，债券市场正在控制着经济。。

Stephen Harper, the Canadian prime minister and host at Toronto, gave the game away when he warned that governments that chose economic growth over fiscal austerity would soon be brought into line. The markets (the ones some supposed had been tamed), Mr Harper said, would see to that.

多伦多会议的主人、加拿大总理Stephen Harper透露，他警告过那些选择将经济增长置于紧缩开支的政府，他们将很快被迫去协调经济增长与紧缩开支之间的关系。Harper先生说，市场（某些 人认为已经被驯服了）将看到这一点。

As for the EU, the only lesson it has lately offered the rest of the world is an object lesson in beggar-thy-neighbour disunity. The splintering of solidarity within the eurozone has seen a reawakening of zero-sum game nationalism.

对于欧盟来说，它们所能给这个世界其他国家的唯一教训就是"以邻为壑"将导致分裂。欧元区团结的破坏再度提醒人们国家间存在的零和博弈。

German chancellor Angela Merkel may think the best way to revive her dismal poll ratings is to berate other Europeans for their profligacy; but no one, least of all German business leaders or voters, has anything to gain from continent-wide deflation.

德国总理梅克尔可能会认为提升她下滑的支持率的最好办法就是去指责其他欧洲国家的肆意挥霍的政策；不过没有人，至少所有的德国上街领袖和投票者能够 从这场扩展于整个大陆的通缩中获得任何东西。

You could say most of this was inevitable. Expectations of the G20 were over-stated. The seeming boldness of world leaders a year ago was a product of the moment. When the global economy is falling off the edge of a cliff it is not too hard for politicians to put aside their differences.

你可能会说这基本上都是不可避免的。G20是难以指望的。一年前世界领导人们表面上的大胆不过是当时局势的产物。当全球经济滑落到悬崖边缘时，政治 家们将分歧放到一边是不困难的。

That said, the emerging discord on how to manage economic imbalances and to put in place effective global financial regulation is part of a pattern of fragmentation. And the differences are not simply between rich and rising nations. The US may be at odds with China over exchange rates, but there is also an important transatlantic rupture about striking the right balance between growth and debt reduction.

你可以说，对于如何管理全球经济的不平衡以及建立有效的全球金融规范说暴露出来的争吵是全球分裂形式的一部分。而且，在发达与发展中国家间的分歧并 不简单。美国可能与中国就汇率问题不和，但在跨大西洋国家间（译注：即美国与欧盟）同样就增长与债务消减问题存在着显著的差异。

Most political leaders – from established and emerging powers alike – recognise the logic of global governance. Most of the world's big challenges are beyond resolution by even the most powerful nations. Think of climate change, financial instability, nuclear proliferation, resource shortages and terrorism.

大部分政治领导人——从已经掌权的到正在掌权的——意识到全球管理的逻辑了。想想气候变化、金融的不稳定性、核扩散、资源短缺和恐怖主义，这大部分 全球性的巨大挑战都超出了即使是最有力量的国家的能力。

For all that, the big nations – the US, China and India among them – are the most reluctant to cede national sovereignty. The problem lies in the collision between the facts of interdependence and those of domestic politics. Voters expect national leaders to shelter them from the storms. These politicians are reluctant to admit they cannot do the job without the agreement of others.

对所有大国——美国、中国、印度都在其中——割让国家主权是不可想象的。问题存在与国际合作的现实要求与国内政治的冲突中。选民们期待国家领导人在 这场风暴中保护他们。政治家们却很难承认他们除非与其他国家达成一致，否则是无法完成这个任务的。

Two big things are missing – international institutions that are viewed by strong and weak alike as effective and legitimate; and, crucially, the trust between competing nations that might persuade them to recognise common interests.

两件重大的事务缺失了：一个能够被强国和弱国都接受的、有效合法的国际机构；最重要的是，相互竞争的国家质检能够由于意识到他们存在共同的利益而被 劝说相互信任。

The capacity of the west to shape events has visibly diminished. The Group of Eight nations, which once imagined it could serve as a global directoire, has been emptied of significant meaning by the G20.

西方国家重塑这两个任务的能力被显著的削弱了。曾经被视为可以作为全球执政内阁的8国集团已经被更有能力的20国集团所架空了。

The economic institutions of the 1945 settlement – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – can claim some effectiveness, but not much legitimacy. They are still dominated by the old powers. So too is permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council – even if the UN itself is viewed by many emerging nations as the only truly legitimate international forum.

1945年建立的经济制度——国际货币基金组织和世界银行——能够承担一些作用，但并不是很合法。它们依然被旧有势力所控制。因此，联合国安理会常 任理事国也是如此，即使是联合国本身被大多数新兴国家视为仅有的合法的国际性机构。

All these institutions are susceptible to reform – but that would depend on trust. The trouble is that rising nations see global governance as a cover for western hegemony. The US, already seeing its power contested, is unwilling to surrender sovereignty. Europeans cling desperately to what they have got as they lean against the winds of economic sclerosis and unfavourable demography.

重新架构所有这些国际组织都是非常敏感的，而那依赖于彼此的信任。麻烦在于新兴国家将全球管制视为西方国家的统治。看到其自身力量受到挑战的美国不 愿意放弃主权。即使面对现在经济硬化症和不佳的人口构成，欧洲还是逆风而行，拼命抓住他们的现有利益不放。

The choice facing the world is not quite as stark as it is sometimes portrayed – between Hobbes' survival of the strongest and friction-free global governance. A project under way by the US National Intelligence Council and the EU Institute for Security Studies sees muddling through as a more likely scenario.

世界所面临的选择并不像有时候在霍布斯的强者生存与无摩擦的全球管制之间所显示的那样绝对。美国国家智库与欧盟安全研究协会的一个研究项目显示，蒙 混过关是一个更可能的场景。

This might see largely unreformed existing institutions co-existing with ad hoc arrangements, regional partnerships and great power co-operation at times of crisis. The G20 (more like 30 when you add the hangers on) does have the merit of throwing together old and rising powers.

很可能可以看到，现存的机构不会有大规模的重建，地区势力和超级大国在危机面前会进行合作。G20（如果你算上迎奉者的话差不多是30个国家）应该 因为它将老的势力与新兴势力组织在一起而受到表扬。

Make do and mend may indeed be the best we can hope for. Some policymakers will tell you that strong global institutions are the product of a stable distribution of power. The geopolitical landscape is changing too fast to allow for a new architecture. They may well be right; but in that case we had better get used to a world of permanent insecurity.

在现有状态下修修补补可能是我们实际上能够期待的最好局面了。某些政策制定者会告诉你，全球性的强有力的机构是势力稳定分配的产物。地缘政治的画面 变化的太快，以致不允许建立一个新的架构。他们可能是对的，不过在这种情况下，我们最好开始习惯一个始终不安全的世界吧。

官方中文翻译：http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033450

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