Russia and its neighbourhood 俄罗斯和它的邻居（们）

原文链接：http://www.economist.com/node/16438707?story_id=16438707

Russia's empty empire
俄罗斯的空虚帝国

Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions founder on the rocks of reality
俄罗斯新帝国主义的野心撞到了现实这块大岩石

Jun 24th 2010
2010年6月24日

SO MUCH for Russia’s “zone of privileged interests” and the West’s worries about it. The phrase was coined by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, in the aftermath of the 2008 war with Georgia, when Russian rhetoric reached shrill levels. The events of the past two weeks in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan have provided a humble reality check and exposed the hollowness of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions among the states that once made up the Soviet Union.
俄罗斯非常关心它的“具有特权的地区”“优先利益地区”以 及西方对这种关切的担心。当俄罗斯就2008年与格鲁吉亚的战争结果尖锐的辩解时，俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫创造了这个短语。过去两周在白俄罗斯和吉尔吉斯坦 之间发生的事件，已经可以提供一个初步的现实测试，并展示了俄罗 斯新帝国主义野心与前苏联加盟共和国间的巨大差异。暴露了俄罗斯的新帝国主义野心在这些前苏联加盟共和国的空洞无力。

Russiahas long wished to keep the West away from its backyard. Now that America and the EU are tied up with their own problems, Russia has had its wish partly granted. Left to its own devices, however, it has shown little leadership, vision or sense of imperial responsibility in its vaunted “zone”.
俄罗斯长期以来一直希望西方远离它的后院。现在，美国和欧盟都被他们自身的问题所束缚，俄罗斯部分的实现了它的愿望。然而，由于它自身的策略硬件条件，在它自夸的“传统区域”，俄罗斯几乎没有显示出 领导力、远景和帝国的责任感。

A spat over gas with Belarus has exposed the fragility of the embryonic customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, put forward by Moscow as the nucleus of a new Russia-dominated economic club. The bloody pogroms in Kyrgyzstan (seearticle)revealthe Collective Security Treaty Organisation—a post-Soviet military alliance of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia—to be a chimera.
莫斯科提议，在俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯之间建立一个由俄罗斯控制的经济俱乐部，而这个刚刚萌芽的关税联盟在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯就天然气问题发生 口角时就已经暴露了它的脆弱。由俄罗斯、吉尔吉斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、白俄罗斯和美国成立的、名为集体安全条约国组织的前苏联后苏联军事联盟，在发生了吉尔吉斯坦的血腥屠杀后，显示 了这样的组织不过是个幻象。

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* Kyrgyzstan's humanitarian crisis: Sad homecomingJun 24th 2010
* 关于吉尔吉斯坦人权的危机：悲伤的返乡（http://www.economist.com/node/16439195）

In its dispute with Belarus this week Russia started to cut gas supplies to its supposed close ally, claiming it was owed some $200m. The debt stems from Belarus’s decision to pay last year’s price of $150 per thousand cubic metres of gas, ignoring a Gazprom price increase. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Belarus’s maverick leader, upped the stakes by ordering a cut in transit shipments of Russian gas to the EU, arguing it was also owed money. On June 24th Gazprom resumed full supply but Belarus maintained its claim.
在本周与白俄罗斯的争吵后，俄罗斯开始切断它假象中的亲密同盟者的天然气供应，并声称白俄罗斯拖欠了它两亿美元的款项。这笔债务起源于白俄罗斯不顾 俄罗斯天然气公司已经涨价的事实，决定按照去年每千立方米150美元的价格支付俄罗斯。卢卡申科，白俄罗斯喜欢标新立异的领导人，提高了从俄罗斯向欧盟供 气的传输费用以要求一个折扣价格，并争辩说白俄罗斯也被拖欠了款项。6月24日，俄罗斯天然气公司恢复了对白俄罗斯的全部供应，但是白俄罗斯依然坚持它的 主张。

This is not the first spat between Russia and Belarus, and it will not be the last. But, as Fyodor Lukyanov, the Russia editor forGlobal Affairs, argues, this time the row has a political flavour. For all his authoritarianism and anti-Americanism, Mr Lukashenka is disdained by Russian officials for reneging on his promises and dragging his feet on agreements. He has skilfully managed to extract large subsidies from Russia while poking it in the eye and playing it off against the EU.
这不是发生在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯之间的第一次口角，也不会是最后一次。不过，按照俄罗斯《全球事务》编辑Lukyanov的看法，此次争吵有一种政治 特性。由于他的独裁主义与反美主义，卢卡申科因为违背他的承诺并践踏协议而被俄罗斯官方所鄙视。他曾经非常巧妙的通过反对欧盟而获取俄罗斯大笔的补助。

Last year the Belarusian president refused to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway Georgian territories over which Russia had warred with Georgia. That was followed by a Russian ban on Belarus’s milk products. More recently, Mr Lukashenka has decided to shelter Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the overthrown authoritarian leader of Kyrgyzstan, who is loathed by Moscow.
去年，白俄罗斯总统拒绝承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹的独立，而 此时俄罗斯正为而当时俄罗斯却为这两个格鲁吉亚的分离地区与格发生了战斗。紧接着，俄罗斯禁止了白俄罗斯的奶制品。最近，卢卡申科又 决定庇护被莫斯科憎恨的吉尔吉斯坦的被推翻的独裁者巴基耶夫。

Mr Lukashenka has also sabotaged the customs union with Kazakhstan and Russia, demanding that Russia scrap its export duty on oil and oil products, which would allow Belarus to buy them at Russia’s domestic prices and to re-export them at a profit. (Russia wants to keep oil out of the union for now.) Russia’s response is to reach for its favourite weapon: the gas taps.
卢卡申科要求俄罗斯放弃石油及石油制品的出口关税，以便白俄罗斯能够以俄罗斯的国内价格购买石油及石油产品，并能够出口获利，而这将破坏哈萨克斯坦 与俄罗斯之间的关税联盟。（而现在，俄罗斯想要将石油排除在这个关税联盟之外）。俄罗斯的反应就是拿出了它最喜爱的武器：天然气敲打对白俄罗斯的天然气龙头（译注：即消减天然 气供应或者提高价格等手段）。

In its relations with its neighbours, Russia has mostly relied on coercion. Consider its response to Mr Bakiyev’s fall and the subsequent pogroms in Kyrgyzstan. The Kremlin shed no tears for Mr Bakiyev, whom it saw as two-faced and greedy. Last year Mr Bakiyev extracted a $2 billion aid package from Russia in exchange for a promise to close an American military air base in Kyrgyzstan, as Russia insisted. He then raised the rent for the American base and allowed it to stay.
俄罗斯常常依靠强力手段来处理它与其邻居们的关系。考虑一下俄罗斯对巴基耶夫的倒台和紧接着发生在吉尔吉斯坦的大屠杀的反应。克里姆林宫对巴基耶夫 毫无同情，而后者被前者视为贪婪的两面派。去年，巴基耶夫从俄罗斯获得了20亿美元的援助，作为交换，他答应关闭俄罗斯一直要求关闭的美国在吉尔吉斯坦的 空军基地。然后，他提高了美军基地的租金并允许其继续待下去。

Solve your own problems
解决你自己的问题

When, earlier this month, the Kyrgyz clashed with the Uzbek minority in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh and the interim government appealed to Russia for military help, the Kremlin stood back. To the outside world it looked like the opportunity Russia had been waiting for to show that it dominates its backyard. To Russia it was a nightmare that evoked memories of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Russia’s official line was that it could not interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs (a statement that sat oddly with Russia’s war against Georgia).
这个月的早些时候，当吉尔吉斯坦在其南部城市Osh与乌兹别克少数民族发生冲突时，临时政府向俄罗斯寻求军事援助，然而克里姆林宫却袖手旁观。对外 界来说，这看上去好像是俄罗斯一直在等待的显示其控制其后院能力的机会。但对俄罗斯来说，这却唤起了80年代苏联卷入阿富汗的噩梦般的会议。俄罗斯官方声 明，它不会干预吉尔吉斯坦的国内事务（一个与俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚却发生战争的声明形成奇怪的对照）。

In fact, Russia has neither the capacity nor the will for such intervention. As Alexander Golts, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, argues, the Russian army—which largely consists of unskilled recruits and is plagued by bullying—is not equipped for the sort of peacekeeping operation they were asked to carry out in Kyrgyzstan. Besides, Russia’s “allies” in the CSTO, particularly nearby Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have no desire to see Russian troops setting a precedent by sorting out the internal affairs of a neighbouring state.
事实上，俄罗斯既没有能力也没有愿望干预此类事件。正如俄罗斯武装力量的研究专家Glot主张的，由大量没有经验、并被恐惧所影响的新兵所组成的俄罗斯军队由大量没有经验的新兵组 成，并蔓延着虐待新兵这种瘟疫行为的俄罗斯军队，并没有准备好去执行吉尔吉斯坦要求的和平行动。另外，俄罗斯在CSTO（集体安全条约国组 织）中的盟友，特别是其近邻乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦，都不愿意看到俄罗斯军队为解决周边国家的内部事务而出兵成为一个惯例。

Russia’s intervention would be unpopular at home too. Xenophobia towards migrant workers from Central Asia and memories of Afghanistan would make any sacrifice of Russian lives in Kyrgyzstan unacceptable to most Russians. Yet, if Russia was right not to send troops to Kyrgyzstan, it was wrong to claim the country as part of a zone of privileged Russian interest.
俄罗斯的干预在其国内也将不会是经常性的是不受欢迎的。 针对来自中亚移民雇工的排外主义和对阿富汗侵略的记忆，对大部分俄罗斯人来说，在吉尔吉斯坦的俄罗斯民众的任何牺牲都是不可接受的。然而，如果俄罗斯不派 遣军队到吉尔吉斯坦是正确的，那么再声明这个国家是俄罗斯特殊利益地区的一部分就是错误的了（译注：也就是说俄罗斯既然不派遣军队协助吉尔吉斯坦解决国内 问题，那么俄罗斯也就无权宣布吉尔吉斯坦是其特殊利益地区）

When ethnic clashes broke out in Osh 20 years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev sent in Soviet troops. Today’s government, for all its Soviet nostalgia, seems to feel no such obligation. What Russia’s response to Kyrgyzstan has made clear, Mr Golts observes, is that “Moscow bosses imitate imperial ambitions in the same way they imitate democracy.”
20年前，当种族冲突发生在Osh时，戈尔巴乔夫派出了苏联军队。今天，那些对前苏联怀旧的政府官员似乎没有感到有这个（出兵）的责任。Golts 先生观察到，俄罗斯对吉尔吉斯坦的反应很清楚了，那就是“莫斯科的老爷们模仿帝国的野心与他们模仿民主的方式是一样的”。