昨晚做了一系列的梦,没什么神奇的地方,也没什么神奇的事,除了梦中蓝绿色的海估计与w的msn签名"黑色的海"有点联系外,实在找不到什么意义,尝试记录如下:
我在一个似乎在进行着联欢会的地方,周围好多人,觉得气闷。离开会场,就到了一个小镇上,忽然,一个人从那种中国小镇典型的二层楼房上摔了下来,然后一个女人跟着他一起掉了下来,而两个孩子也被他们从一块大篷布上带了下去。我慌忙找出手机拨打120,结果120的人不断的逼问我伤者的详细信息,告诉我不要多管闲事。气得我破口大骂问他们是否以后看到匪徒或者火警打电话也要先搞清楚匪徒的详细个人信息或者失火的原因。
然后,我发现手机没了。这时一个人走过来要和我换手机,我一看,奇怪,手上居然拿着一个数字键盘的手机,我的全键盘手机却在那个人手上。怪不得他要和我换,可是我的手机怎么发生了交换的呢?交换手机后,我想继续拨打120,结果无论如何无法拨打,关机重启,结果电源键完全陷了下去,手机破了个大洞。
随后,我似乎和几个朋友来到了类似香格里拉的地方。天很冷。我一个人走到山间的悬崖边往远处看,却发现山脚下一片蓝绿色的大海,海边与沙滩上却是热带风光。我顺着山崖一下子就滑到了那片海边。周围人山人海,都是泳衣泳裤,而在海边却有着很多一层楼高的建筑物,之间的街道很窄,颇类似老白渡南街的那种味道,但是街道都淹没在到脚面高的海水中。我四处闲逛了一下,就想回山上叫朋友们一起下来。
然后,梦醒了。
这个梦除了第二段外,似乎完全没有事情发生,有的只是各种场景。周围全都是陌生人。最奇怪的却是醒来后清晰的记得这一切。
Orignal From: 昨晚的系列梦
2010年7月27日星期二
2010年7月15日星期四
60+ GreaseMonkey(油猴)插件脚本推荐
什么是GreaseMonkey脚本?
Greasemonkey 是一个 firefox 扩展, 它具有通过编写脚本来改变被访问网页的功能。使用它,能使您访问的网站更便于阅读或者更便于使用。使用它,您能修复网页渲染的缺陷,而无须烦扰网站 管理员。使用它,您能让网页更好地使用残疾人援助技术,清楚响亮地说出网页内容,或者将网页内容变为盲文。使用它,您能自动地获得其它网站的数据,从而使 两个网站更好地相互链接起来。
然而 Greasemonkey 本身并没有作这些事。实际上,在您安装它之后,您注意到根本没有任何变动…直到您开始安装一种叫做"用户脚本"的东西。用户脚本(user script)就是一大块 javascript 代码,还有些附加信息,用来告诉 Greasemonkey 脚本应该在何时何地运行。每个用户脚本能够针对具体页面,具体网站,或者 一批网站。用户脚本能做到您在 Javascript 中可做到的任何事情。实际上,它能做得更多,因为 Greasemonkey 提供了专供用户脚本使用的函数。via
如何安装GreaseMonkey和脚本?
Greasemonkey的安装非常简单,和安装其它所有Firefox插件一样,到官方主页下载http://www.greasespot.net, 选择工具 (T)单。您应该看到四个菜单项:启用 (E)、管理用户脚本 (U)…、新建 用户脚本 (N)…和用户脚本命令 (C)。 只要管理用户脚本 (U)…可以使用,那么就装好了。装用户脚本也很简单,点击要安装的脚本链 接,会弹出一个标题为"Greasemonkey 安装过程"的对话框,其中显示了将要安装的用户脚本名称,简介以及作用与排除的页面列表。确定安装即可。
GreaseMonkey脚本推荐
下面就推荐一些比较受欢迎的Greasemonkey脚本。
1. Gmail的Greasemonkey脚本
Google Account Multi-Login
可以将Gmail右上角的Logout变成选择多个Gmail帐号切换按钮,适合多个Gmail帐号使用者。
Right Click Menu in Gmail
在你的Gmail中增加右键功能,右键包括"inbox", "compose new", "sent messages", "contacts"等。
Folders4Gmail
用类似文件夹的形式来管理你的Lables。
Gmail Super Clean
美化Gmail界面。
Gmail HTML Signatures
为Gmail增加 html签 名,也可以使用我之前介绍的WiseStamp。
Gmail Filter Assistant
Fliter助手,增加一个Filter管理模块,是你能够方便的创建filter。
Gmail Addons
增加各种功能到Gmail,包括Calendar等。
Gmail + Reader Integrator
喜欢 Gmail 和 Google Reader 的你怎么可以错过这个在 Gmail 里面看 Google Reader 的 addon ?
Gmail Spam-count Hide
隐藏 Gmail 中垃圾邮件的计数。就是传说中眼不见为净的境界。
2. Google日历的Greasemonkey脚本
Google Calendar Header and Navigation Switcher
在 Google 日历的左侧和顶端显示小三角,点击它们可以隐藏 / 显示左侧栏和顶部空间,最大化主区域的面积,折叠状态可记忆。
Google Calendar Wheel Viewer
在月视图、自定义视图中用鼠标滚轮翻屏,这是 Google 日历自身没有提供的。
Google Calendar Display Current Time Line
在日视图、周视图、自定义视图中显示一条当前时间的红线,适合日程多的大忙人使用。
3. Google Reader的Greasemonkey脚本
Google Reader: Show Feed Favicons
在Google Reader中显示Feed Favicons。
Google Reader Subscribers Count
在右下角显示此feed有多少用户通过google reader订阅。
Google Reader Redux
安装后你的Google Reader里所订阅的RSS Feed将会作为一个新菜单项出现在Gmail左侧上方。
Google Reader Preview Enhanced
增加Feed网页预览功能。你可以在feed的List和expand视图进行预览。
Google Reader for wider screens
改变Google Reader现实宽度,以使宽屏电脑用户获得更好的用户体验。
Google reader full feed changer
现在有些Feed不是全文输出,怎么办呢,可以使用此脚本,实现获取feed全文。
Google Reader Minimalistic
获得最简洁的Google Reader界面。
Colorful List View
这个脚本的功能是给Google reader的list view根据不同的feed着色,效果是很华丽的。如果你的feed不多,用这个脚本可以清楚地分别出不同来源的文章,但如果你有几百个不同的feed, 这个脚本恐怕不适合你,太花了。
GoogleMonkeyR
超强的google搜索结果页增强脚本,功能包括多列显示搜索结果、移除右侧付费结果、给搜索结果编号、自动载入翻页结果等等。必装。
4. Google搜索的Greasemonkey脚本
Google Thumbnails
在搜索结果前增加网页的缩略图。
GoogleTagCloudMaker
利用搜索结果显示出一个Tag Cloud,让你更方便找到相关的内容。
Google 100
让Google每页显示100个搜索结果
Google Air Skin
可拥有多个Google应用服务的皮肤。
AutoPagerize (Pagination)
自动翻页脚本。
Google Ad Remover
从Google搜索结果中去除任何广告。
Google Account Multi-Login
多个Google账号登录。没什么需要解释的,如果有好几个Google账号的话,这个脚本很方便。
Google Shortcuts
也是针对Google搜索的一个脚本,安装后,在Google主页输入i:搜索内容 可以直接调用google图片搜索,输入w:搜索内容 则是调用wikpedia, y: 自然是youtube了。
Google Search Sidebar for FF3
为 Google 搜索结果页面加入一个右侧边栏,其中包括来自 Wikipedia、YouTube 和 Flickr 的搜索结果。只要 Google 一次,就能得到这许多结果,相当方便。
Multi-Column Results
将 Google 搜索结果分为多栏,使用 Alt + 1/2/3 组合键可在一栏、二栏、三栏切换,适合宽屏用户。
Google Time Search
提供选项,让你可以搜索指定时间范围内的网页(如过去 24 小时)。
Twitter Search on Google Search Pages
twitter 已经成为最为实时的信息中心,这个 GreaseMonkey 脚本能将 Twitter 搜索结果结成到 Google 中。
Fixed Topbar
提供一个悬浮的导航条,包括到新闻搜索、图像搜索和翻页的连接,可以节省你不少时间。
Delicious Search Results on Google
将 Delicious 的搜索结果集成至 Google。
5. 通用的浏览器辅助增强Greasemonkey脚本
GoogleTagCloudMaker
自动在搜索结果的右边生成标签云(tagcloud,覆盖了原来的赞助商广告),鼠标停留在某个标签上,就会把含有此标签的搜索结果显示在最前面。 可能我说的不是很清楚,原文也说的不是很清楚。安装一下,你就知道有多好用了。Gfan 必备!支持中文标签云哦。
Disable Text Ads
自动移除 VibrantMedia(IntelliTXT), Kontera 和 Linkworth
的内文文字广告。
RSS+Atom Feed Subscribe Button Generator
当你发现一个优秀的新博客时,你还在满屏幕找 RSS 订阅按钮吗?安装这个 addon 之后,你只需在左上角点击自动生成的订阅按钮。(感觉不是很实用,如果有高手会修改这个脚本的话,建议为这个脚本添加更强的功能:订阅到抓虾之类的按 钮。)
Textarea Backup
文本框备份。你每按下十个按键、每十秒、文本框失去焦点(就是一闪一闪的竖线状光标在文本框中消失的时候),该 addon 会自动备份一次。当文本成功提交到服务器时,保存的文字会自动删除。会自动还原的哦。
LookItUp
选中网页文字,按下" w ",右边会出现 Wikipedia 中该词的页面。原文说可以自定义,对高手来说可能比较简单。
Linkify ting
自动把一个 URL 地址变成可以点击的链接。
Google MP3
自动调用 Google MP3 Player 播放任意网页中的 MP3 ,关于 Google MP3 Player 是这样的,Gmail 会自动调用 Google MP3 Player 来播放附件中的 MP3 文件,既然 Gmail 能用这个播放器,我们当然也能拿来用了。
简 繁转换
用于对网页进行简繁体转换阅读。
6. 视频下载的Greasemonkey脚本
Apple Trailer Download
让你可以非常方便地从 movie trailers from apple.com 下载任意大小的视频。用法在你要下载的大小上右键,选择"链接另存为"。
Download Video
让你轻轻松松得到 YouTube, Google Video, Myspace, Metacafe, Break.com, Putfile, Dailymotion 和 Sevenload 里面的视频的真实地址。只要点击页面顶部黄色的 Get download link(s) to video(s) 就行。
7. Web 2.0网站增强的Greasemonkey脚本
del.icio.us Prettifier
是不是觉得 del.icio.us 的界面很没特色(很难看)?快安装上吧。
IMDB enlarge actor pictures on hover
放大 IMDB (电影资料库,这里我链接的是其中文版)中演员的照片。
AdSlicer for MySpace
移除 MySpace 中的广告和空白。
YouTube Googler
让 YouTube 的界面看起来想 Google Videos ,看来是某狂热 Gfan 的杰作。
Facebook Auto-Colorizer
facebook 颜色主题一个。
Digg – Add Mirror
在 digg it 按钮下添加这样几个按钮:在 DuggMirror , Coral Cache, Google Cache 和 Archive.org 中查看该 digg 。当该 digg 的源链接过期,你还是可以轻松地浏览该 digg 的详细内容。也可以当成代理来使用。
Last.fm Artist Fan Rank
last.fm 是一个 Web 2.0 音乐分享社区。我安装该 addon 之后,去了 Last.fm 一趟,不知道它到底是用来干嘛的。-_-|||(我已经修改了该 addon 的作用网页范围。)
8. 豆瓣相关Greasemonkey脚本
Reply buttons for new Douban
给每个帖子添加回复按钮和引用按钮,适用于豆瓣的评论,小组,日记,站务论坛,活动论坛,书影音论坛等。 点击回复按钮自动在下方的输入框中添加 @<用户ID>, 点击引用按钮则自动在下方的输入框中引用全文, 并会自动将输入焦点移至输入框,方便你在豆瓣的讨论。
Friends Toolbar for Douban
在豆瓣的"友邻广播"页面,增加一个浮动的联络用工具条。
Douban Sliding Navbar
悬停式的豆瓣二级导航栏,实现了2007.11.16豆瓣改版风波中部分用户主张的悬停式二级导航栏。
相要查找更多GreaseMonkey脚本,你可以到这个网站: http://userscripts.org/
Orignal From: 60+ GreaseMonkey(油猴)插件脚本推荐
2010年7月14日星期三
SPLINTERED SOLIDARITY HAS PUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN A SPIN
破裂的团结导致全球管理陷于困境
By Philip Stephens
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033450/en
Whatever happened to global governance. The Group of 20 was supposed to answer the question of our times – how do rich and rising nations manage competing and coincident interests in an interdependent world? The best that the G20 leaders could come up with the other day was polite agreement to disagree.
无论全球管理发生了什么事情,人们期望20国集团回答我们这个时代的问题:富裕国家与正在富裕的国家如何在这个联系日益紧密的世界中管理竞争与利益 的合作?20国集团的领导人所能做的最好的事情也就是某天聚集在一起,然后礼貌的一致表达他们的互不一致。
Heady talk of a new international architecture stirred by last year's London G20 gathering is long behind us. There have since been three big global challenges on the agenda – about the shape of the financial system and the path of economic recovery, about climate change and about trade.
去年在伦敦20国集团聚会上,成立一个令人激动的新国际架构的讨论远远落后于(我们的期待)了。自那以后,议事日程上还有三个全球性的挑战——金融 系统的重塑与经济复苏的方法,气候变化,以及全球贸易。
On the first, as we saw at the weekend G20 gathering in Toronto, governments are mostly going their own ways, albeit with elements of bilateral co-operation. Barack Obama, I heard this week in Washington, thought the summit pretty much a waste of time.
首先,正如我们所看到的,在多伦多这个周末的G20会议上,尽管有着双边协议的基础,各国领导人还是自说自话。这周在华盛顿,我听说奥巴马认为这个 的高层会议纯粹是浪费时间。
Progress on climate change has largely stalled since the half-failure (or half-success, according to taste) of the Copenhagen summit. As for trade, the rich nations have abandoned hope of concluding the Doha round in favour of new bilateral and regional deals.
自从哥本哈根高层会议上气候变化的议题半失败(根据不同的口味,也可以说半成功)以后,谈判进程已经基本停了下来。而在贸易问题上,发达国家已经放 弃了在多哈回合的基础上达成的新的双边和地区协议的希望。
The financial crisis saw unity forged in adversity. Political leaders vowed to wrest back command of their destinies from out-of-control markets. Co-ordinated growth strategies merged national with mutual interests.
金融危机促使各国在艰难时事下协调一致。政治领导人发誓将他们的命运从失控的市场中挽救回来。合作增长的战略将国民利益与共同利益结合起来了。
Europeans boasted that if the US, China and others wanted an example of how interdependence could be made to work to shared advantage they need look no further than the European Union. Europe's unique experiment in shared sovereignty provided a model for a global settlement.
欧洲人自夸说,如果美国、中国和其他国家想看到在共享利益的基础上的相互信赖是如何建立的实例,他们不必往远处看,只要看看欧盟就知道了。欧洲在分 享主权的基础上的联合试验为一个全球性的协议的建立提供了一个模式。
And now. The crisis has passed, and with it the imperative to co-operate and co-ordinate. Politics has turned local again. For all the grandiose talk of curbing the excesses of laisser faire capitalism, the markets remain the masters. The banks have got off lightly, the bankers are still picking up their bonuses, and the bond markets are calling the economic shots.
现在,随着危机的过去,最重要的合作与协同也一并逝去。国内政治议题开始提升。在所有的关于自由放任资本主义的浮夸的批评之后,市场重新成为了主导 力量。银行轻松的下了车(译注:逃脱了惩罚),银行家们依然获得高额奖金,债券市场正在控制着经济。。
Stephen Harper, the Canadian prime minister and host at Toronto, gave the game away when he warned that governments that chose economic growth over fiscal austerity would soon be brought into line. The markets (the ones some supposed had been tamed), Mr Harper said, would see to that.
多伦多会议的主人、加拿大总理Stephen Harper透露,他警告过那些选择将经济增长置于紧缩开支的政府,他们将很快被迫去协调经济增长与紧缩开支之间的关系。Harper先生说,市场(某些 人认为已经被驯服了)将看到这一点。
As for the EU, the only lesson it has lately offered the rest of the world is an object lesson in beggar-thy-neighbour disunity. The splintering of solidarity within the eurozone has seen a reawakening of zero-sum game nationalism.
对于欧盟来说,它们所能给这个世界其他国家的唯一教训就是"以邻为壑"将导致分裂。欧元区团结的破坏再度提醒人们国家间存在的零和博弈。
German chancellor Angela Merkel may think the best way to revive her dismal poll ratings is to berate other Europeans for their profligacy; but no one, least of all German business leaders or voters, has anything to gain from continent-wide deflation.
德国总理梅克尔可能会认为提升她下滑的支持率的最好办法就是去指责其他欧洲国家的肆意挥霍的政策;不过没有人,至少所有的德国上街领袖和投票者能够 从这场扩展于整个大陆的通缩中获得任何东西。
You could say most of this was inevitable. Expectations of the G20 were over-stated. The seeming boldness of world leaders a year ago was a product of the moment. When the global economy is falling off the edge of a cliff it is not too hard for politicians to put aside their differences.
你可能会说这基本上都是不可避免的。G20是难以指望的。一年前世界领导人们表面上的大胆不过是当时局势的产物。当全球经济滑落到悬崖边缘时,政治 家们将分歧放到一边是不困难的。
That said, the emerging discord on how to manage economic imbalances and to put in place effective global financial regulation is part of a pattern of fragmentation. And the differences are not simply between rich and rising nations. The US may be at odds with China over exchange rates, but there is also an important transatlantic rupture about striking the right balance between growth and debt reduction.
你可以说,对于如何管理全球经济的不平衡以及建立有效的全球金融规范说暴露出来的争吵是全球分裂形式的一部分。而且,在发达与发展中国家间的分歧并 不简单。美国可能与中国就汇率问题不和,但在跨大西洋国家间(译注:即美国与欧盟)同样就增长与债务消减问题存在着显著的差异。
Most political leaders – from established and emerging powers alike – recognise the logic of global governance. Most of the world's big challenges are beyond resolution by even the most powerful nations. Think of climate change, financial instability, nuclear proliferation, resource shortages and terrorism.
大部分政治领导人——从已经掌权的到正在掌权的——意识到全球管理的逻辑了。想想气候变化、金融的不稳定性、核扩散、资源短缺和恐怖主义,这大部分 全球性的巨大挑战都超出了即使是最有力量的国家的能力。
For all that, the big nations – the US, China and India among them – are the most reluctant to cede national sovereignty. The problem lies in the collision between the facts of interdependence and those of domestic politics. Voters expect national leaders to shelter them from the storms. These politicians are reluctant to admit they cannot do the job without the agreement of others.
对所有大国——美国、中国、印度都在其中——割让国家主权是不可想象的。问题存在与国际合作的现实要求与国内政治的冲突中。选民们期待国家领导人在 这场风暴中保护他们。政治家们却很难承认他们除非与其他国家达成一致,否则是无法完成这个任务的。
Two big things are missing – international institutions that are viewed by strong and weak alike as effective and legitimate; and, crucially, the trust between competing nations that might persuade them to recognise common interests.
两件重大的事务缺失了:一个能够被强国和弱国都接受的、有效合法的国际机构;最重要的是,相互竞争的国家质检能够由于意识到他们存在共同的利益而被 劝说相互信任。
The capacity of the west to shape events has visibly diminished. The Group of Eight nations, which once imagined it could serve as a global directoire, has been emptied of significant meaning by the G20.
西方国家重塑这两个任务的能力被显著的削弱了。曾经被视为可以作为全球执政内阁的8国集团已经被更有能力的20国集团所架空了。
The economic institutions of the 1945 settlement – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – can claim some effectiveness, but not much legitimacy. They are still dominated by the old powers. So too is permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council – even if the UN itself is viewed by many emerging nations as the only truly legitimate international forum.
1945年建立的经济制度——国际货币基金组织和世界银行——能够承担一些作用,但并不是很合法。它们依然被旧有势力所控制。因此,联合国安理会常 任理事国也是如此,即使是联合国本身被大多数新兴国家视为仅有的合法的国际性机构。
All these institutions are susceptible to reform – but that would depend on trust. The trouble is that rising nations see global governance as a cover for western hegemony. The US, already seeing its power contested, is unwilling to surrender sovereignty. Europeans cling desperately to what they have got as they lean against the winds of economic sclerosis and unfavourable demography.
重新架构所有这些国际组织都是非常敏感的,而那依赖于彼此的信任。麻烦在于新兴国家将全球管制视为西方国家的统治。看到其自身力量受到挑战的美国不 愿意放弃主权。即使面对现在经济硬化症和不佳的人口构成,欧洲还是逆风而行,拼命抓住他们的现有利益不放。
The choice facing the world is not quite as stark as it is sometimes portrayed – between Hobbes' survival of the strongest and friction-free global governance. A project under way by the US National Intelligence Council and the EU Institute for Security Studies sees muddling through as a more likely scenario.
世界所面临的选择并不像有时候在霍布斯的强者生存与无摩擦的全球管制之间所显示的那样绝对。美国国家智库与欧盟安全研究协会的一个研究项目显示,蒙 混过关是一个更可能的场景。
This might see largely unreformed existing institutions co-existing with ad hoc arrangements, regional partnerships and great power co-operation at times of crisis. The G20 (more like 30 when you add the hangers on) does have the merit of throwing together old and rising powers.
很可能可以看到,现存的机构不会有大规模的重建,地区势力和超级大国在危机面前会进行合作。G20(如果你算上迎奉者的话差不多是30个国家)应该 因为它将老的势力与新兴势力组织在一起而受到表扬。
Make do and mend may indeed be the best we can hope for. Some policymakers will tell you that strong global institutions are the product of a stable distribution of power. The geopolitical landscape is changing too fast to allow for a new architecture. They may well be right; but in that case we had better get used to a world of permanent insecurity.
在现有状态下修修补补可能是我们实际上能够期待的最好局面了。某些政策制定者会告诉你,全球性的强有力的机构是势力稳定分配的产物。地缘政治的画面 变化的太快,以致不允许建立一个新的架构。他们可能是对的,不过在这种情况下,我们最好开始习惯一个始终不安全的世界吧。
官方中文翻译:http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033450
Orignal From: SPLINTERED SOLIDARITY HAS PUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN A SPIN
2010年7月9日星期五
A special report on debt 特别报导:债务
原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/16397110?story_id=16397110
A special report on debt
特别报导:债务
Repent at leisure
后悔莫及
Borrowing has been the answer to all economic troubles in the past 25 years. Now debt itself has become the problem, says Philip Coggan
在过去25年 里,借债已经成为所有经济问题的答案。现在,债务本身成为了经济问题。——Philip Coggan
Jun 24th 2010
2010年6月24日
MAN is born free but is everywhere in debt. In the rich world, getting hold of your first credit card is a rite of passage far more important for your daily life than casting your first vote. Buying your first home normally requires taking on a debt several times the size of your annual income. And even if you shun the temptation of borrowing to indulge yourself, you are still saddled with your portion of the national debt.
人是生而自由却又躲不开债务。在发达国家,相比于投下你的第一张 选票,拥有一张信用卡对于你的日常生活来说是个更为重要的阶段。购买你的第一个住处通常需要背上数倍于你年收入的债务。并且,即使你抵御住了为放纵生活而 借贷的诱惑,你仍然将承担国家债务中的一部分。
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s a rise in debt levels accompanied what economists called the "great moderation", when growth was steady and unemployment and inflation remained low. No longer did Western banks have to raise rates to halt consumer booms. By the early 2000s a vast international scheme of vendor financing had been created. China and the oil exporters amassed current-account surpluses and then lent the money back to the developed world so it could keep buying their goods.
整个20世 纪80~90年代,由于经济稳定的增长,失 业率和通胀率保持在低水平,经济学家们称这段时间为"大稳定"时期,而一个不断增长的负债水平就伴随着这个时期。西方的银行不再必须提高利率来限制消费者 的激增。到21世纪初期,一个庞大的、国际性的供应商融资方式被创造了出来。中国和石油出口国在经 常项目上累积了大量过剩的资金,然后他们将这些钱借给发达国家,以便这些国家继续购买他们的商品。
Those who cautioned against rising debt levels were dismissed as doom-mongers; after all, asset prices were rising even faster, so balance-sheets looked healthy. And with the economy buoyant, debtors could afford to meet their interest payments without defaulting. In short, it paid to borrow and it paid to lend.
那些警告不要增长债务水平的人作为灾难预言者而被解雇了;毕竟, 资产价格增长的更迅速,从而资产负债表看上去很健康。并且,随着经济的复苏,债务人能够不违约的支付他们的利息。总之就是,借了还,还了借。
Like alcohol, a debt boom tends to induce euphoria. Traders and investors saw the asset-price rises it brought with it as proof of their brilliance; central banks and governments thought that rising markets and higher tax revenues attested to the soundness of their policies.
如同酒精一样,债务的增长倾向于导致过度亢奋。贸易商和投资人看 到资产价格的攀升,这似乎证明了他们的英明;央行与政府认为市场的增长与税收证实了他们政策的稳定性。
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The answer to all problems seemed to be more debt. Depressed? Use your credit card for a shopping spree "because you're worth it". Want to get rich quick? Work for a private-equity or hedge-fund firm, using borrowed money to enhance returns. Looking for faster growth for your company? Borrow money and make an acquisition. And if the economy is in recession, let the government go into deficit to bolster spending. When the European Union countries met in May to deal with the Greek crisis, they proposed a €750 billion ($900 billion) rescue programme largely consisting of even more borrowed money.
所有问题的答案好象是"更多的负债"。心情沮丧?那用你的信用卡 去大血拼,"因为你值得拥有"。想快速发财?那去为私营公司或者对冲基金工作,用借来的钱增加回报。为你的公司寻找快速的增长?去借钱并提高收益。并且如 果经济不景气,那么让政府赤字化运营以支持政府开支。当欧盟国家5月份处理希腊危机时,他们提出了 一份7500亿欧元(9000亿美元)的拯 救计划,该计划甚至包括大量借来的钱。
Debt increased at every level, from consumers to companies to banks to whole countries. The effect varied from country to country, but a survey by the McKinsey Global Institute found that average total debt (private and public sector combined) in ten mature economies rose from 200% of GDP in 1995 to 300% in 2008 (see chart 1 for a breakdown by country). There were even more startling rises in Iceland and Ireland, where debt-to-GDP ratios reached 1,200% and 700% respectively. The burdens proved too much for those two countries, plunging them into financial crisis. Such turmoil is a sign that debt is not the instant solution it was made out to be. The market cheer that greeted the EU package for Greece lasted just one day before the doubts resurfaced.
债务在各个层面上都在增长,从消费者到公司,从银行到整个国家。 债务影响了各式各样的国家,不过根据麦肯锡全球机构的研究发现,在十个成熟经济国家,平均来说总的债务(包括私营与国营部门)占GDP的份额是从1995年的200%上涨到2008年的300%(见图表一中的国别分析)。对冰岛和爱尔兰来说,债务占GDP的 份额令人吃惊的分别上升到了1200%和700%。 这样的负担充分证明了这两个国家深陷金融危机之中。这样的混乱局面说明债务不是一个直接解决问题的方法,恰恰是遭遇的问题。在疑虑浮现以前,市场仅仅为欧 盟的拯救希腊的方案欢呼了一天。
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From early 2007 onwards there were signs that economies were reaching the limit of their ability to absorb more borrowing. The growth-boosting potential of debt seemed to peter out. According to Leigh Skene of Lombard Street Research, each additional dollar of debt was associated with less and less growth (see chart 2).
2007年之前,就有迹象表明,整个经济体系已经到达了其吸收更多债务的 能力极限了。债务大量增长的潜力似乎正在消失。根据Lombard Street研究所的Leigh Skene的研究,额外增加的每一美元债务与经济增长的联系越来越小(见图二)。
Stopping the debt supercycle
停止债务的超级循环
The big question is whether this rapid build-up of debt—a phenomenon which Martin Barnes of the Bank Credit Analyst, a research group, has dubbed the "debt supercycle"—has now come to an end. Debt reduction has become a hot political issue. Rioters on the streets of Athens have been protesting against the "junta of the markets" that is imposing austerity on the Greek economy, and tea-party activists in America, angry about trillion-dollar deficits and growing government involvement in the economy, have been upsetting the calculations of both the Democratic and Republican party leaderships.
最大的问题是如此快速增长的债务(这种现象被一个研究组织的银行 信贷分析家Marting Barnes称之为"债务超级大循环")现在是否已经接近结束了。债务 消减已经成为一个热门的政治议题。雅典街道上的抗议者已经在反对那些要在希腊经济上推行收缩的"市场军阀们"(译注:即压缩政府福利开支),而美国的那些 为政府卷入数十亿亏空和债务增长而愤怒的茶叶党人活动家,已经搅乱了民主、共和两党的领导人对(选票)的计算考虑。
To understand why debt may have become a burden rather than a boon, it is necessary to go back to first principles. Why do people, companies and countries borrow? One obvious answer is that it is the only way they can maintain their desired level of spending. Another reason is optimism; they believe the return on the borrowed money will be greater than the cost of servicing the debt. Crucially, creditors must believe that debtors' incomes will rise; otherwise how would they be able to pay the interest and repay the capital?
要理解为什么债务已经开始成为一个负担而不是一种福利,必须回到 经济学的第一规律。人、公司和国家为什么要借贷?一个显然的答案就是债务可以满足他们的渴望的消费水平。另一个乐观主义的原因是,他们都相信来自债务的回 报将大于债务的成本。重要的是,债权人必须相信债务人的收入会增长;否则,债务人如何支付利息并归还本金?
But in parts of the rich world such optimism may now be misplaced. With ageing populations and shrinking workforces, their economies may grow more slowly than they have done in the past. They may have borrowed from the future, using debt to enjoy a standard of living that is unsustainable. Greece provides a stark example. Standard & Poor's, a rating agency, estimates that its GDP will not regain its 2008 level until 2017.
不过,在富裕世界的某些地方,这样的乐观主义可能放错了地方。随 着人口老龄化和生产力的下降,他们的经济增长可能远远落后于过去的年代。他们可能已经在透支未来,用债务来享受那个已经无法继续维持的生活水平。希腊提供 了一个完整的样本。一个联合国的评级机构,S&P(译注:只查到是联合国下属的一个机构) 预计,希腊要到2017年才能将其GDP恢 复到2008年的水平。
Rising government debt is a Ponzi scheme that requires an ever-growing population to assume the burden—unless some deus ex machina, such as a technological breakthrough, can boost growth. As Roland Nash, head of research at Renaissance Capital, an investment bank, puts it: "Can the West, with its regulated industry, uncompetitive labour and large government, afford its borrowing-funded living standards and increasingly expensive public sectors?"
增长中的政府债务其实是一种庞氏骗局,它需要有人不断的加入来承 担先加入者的负担——除非出现了解围的事件,比如一次技术革命的突破,才能使其继续增长下去。正如一家名为复兴资本的投资银行的研究室主任所说的:"西方 世界凭着其常规工业、缺乏竞争力的劳动者和庞大的政府,能通过它投入借来的钱来支撑其现有的生活水平和不断增长的、昂贵的公共部门的支出吗?"
Sovereign default is far from inconceivable. Many people are forecasting that Greece, despite its bail-out package from the EU and the IMF, will be unable to repay its debts in full and on time. Faced with the choice between punishing their populations with austerity programmes and letting down foreign creditors, countries may find it easier to disappoint the foreigners. Defaults have been common in the past, as Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff showed in their book, "This Time is Different". Adam Smith, a founding father of economics, noted in "The Wealth of Nations" that "when national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having being fairly and completely paid."
独立国家拖欠债务是非常的难以置信的。许多人正在预测,尽管希腊 从欧盟与国际货币基金组织获得了帮助,它也没有能力及时足额的偿还其债务。当面临用紧缩计划惩罚其本国民众还是欺压外国债权人的选择时,国家会发现让外国 人失望要容易得多。正如Carmen Reinhart和Ken Rogoff的书《这个时代不同了》中所说的,违约比过去普遍多了。亚当.斯密 斯,经济学的创始人,在其《国富论》中写道:"当国家债务已经积累到某个程度时,我相信,公平的、完整支付债务的例子将是罕见的。"(译注:就是说国债达 到一定程度,国家必然赖帐)
Governments now face a tricky period when they have to deal with the debt overhang, decide how quickly to cut their deficits (and risk undermining growth), and try to distribute the pain of doing so as equitably as possible.
处理高悬的帐务使现在的政府面临一个棘手的时期:需要决定如何快 速的消减赤字(并且要冒经济下滑的风险),而且要尽可能公正的在国民中分摊紧缩带来的痛苦。
Debt is often treated as a moral issue as well as an economic one. Margaret Atwood, in her book of essays, "Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth", notes that the Aramaic words for debt and sin are the same. And some versions of the Lord's Prayer say "Forgive us our debts" rather than "Forgive us our trespasses".
债务常常被看成即是一个道德议题,又是一个经济议题。Margaret Atwood在她的随笔集《支付:债务和财富的影子边缘》中写到:在Aramaic语中,债务与罪恶是同一个词。在某些祝祷文中,"免除我的债务"比"赦免我的罪过"更多。
The Live 8 campaign in 2005 tried to shame developed nations into forgiving the debts of poor countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Economists have developed the concept of "odious debt" in which citizens should not be forced to repay money borrowed by tyrannical or kleptocratic rulers. Interest payments on debt are often regarded as an onerous burden placed on the poor; interest is seen as an unjustified reward for capital, a concept that goes back to Aristotle and is implicit in the Christian idea of usury. Islam forbids it altogether. The book of Deuteronomy suggested a debt amnesty every seven years, which survived into later Jewish custom.
2005年的"Live 8"运动试图使发达国家感 到羞愧并免除贫困国家,尤其是撒哈拉南部国家的债务。经济学家创造了"可憎债务"的概念,即那些国家的公民不应当被强制支付由其独裁者或者盗窃国家的统治 者所借的债务。债务利息的支付对于穷人来说也常常被认为是沉重的负担,利息被视为资本不当得利的概念,其实是回到 了亚里士多德时代,而基督徒则认为这显然就是高利贷。伊斯兰教则完全禁止借贷利息。晚近时期,犹太人还遵守着《申命记》中每七年进行一次债务赦免的风俗。
But conventional morality has not always been on the side of the borrowers. Some regard debt as the road to ruin and the failure to repay as a breach of trust. In the 18th and 19th century debtors in Britain were often thrown into jail (as in Charles Dickens's "Little Dorrit"), though Samuel Johnson spotted the flaws of the practice: "We have now imprisoned one generation of debtors after another, but we do not find that their numbers lessen. We have now learned that rashness and imprudence will not be deterred from taking credit; let us try whether fraud and avarice may be more easily restrained from giving it."
不过通常的道德观念并不总是站在借款者一边的。有些人认为债务是 通向毁灭之路,并且拖延偿还则破坏了彼此的信任。在18到19世 纪的英国,负债者常常被投入监狱(象狄更斯小说《小多莉》所描写的),虽然Samul Johnson指 出了这种方式的缺陷:"我们已经一个接一个的将负债者投入监狱,但是我们并没有发现负债者的数量在减少。我们现在知道了,借贷这种轻率行为并不会被阻止; 让我们试试,欺诈与贪婪是否可能比给予更容易被制止。"
Movable morals
变动的道德观
In the past 100 years the moral battle has moved in favour of the debtors. Bankruptcy is no longer stigmatised but simply regarded as bad luck. When consumers borrow beyond their means, the blame is laid on lax lending practices rather than irresponsible borrowing. Governments have encouraged more people to become homeowners and thus to take on debt. And defaulting on one's debts has become much less cumbersome; in the current housing slump many American homeowners have resorted to "jingle mail", dropping their keys through the lender's letterbox and walking away from their property.
在过去的100年 中,道德观已经转向支持负债者。破产不再被视为可耻的而仅仅是运气不好。当消费者的借贷超出他们的收入时,人们更多的是责备宽松的出借行为而不是不负责任 的借贷。政府已经鼓励更多的民众通过借贷而拥有房产。而且拖欠债务已经变得不再那么麻烦了;在当前的房市萧条中,许多美国房产业主采取了"叮当邮件"的做 法,即将房门钥匙邮寄给债权人然后离开房屋。(译注:断供并搬离)
In business, a few failed directorships are a sign of entrepreneurship rather than incompetence. America's Chapter 11 process allows the managers of companies to remain in place and the business to be protected from its creditors. The number of companies with safe AAA credit ratings has collapsed as more have acted on the theory that a debt-laden balance-sheet is more efficient (because interest payments are tax-deductible in most countries).
在商界,一些失败的商业项目被视为企业家(冒险)精神的象征而不 是不称职的表现。美国《破产法》第十一章允许公司的经理人待在他的位置上继续经营(并将所得用于清偿财务)而免于债权人的(直接清算)。许多按照资产负债 表越是负债累累,其运营越有效率的理论(因为在大多数国家,利息的支付是可以免税的)运行并具有安全的AAA信 用评级的公司的数量已大幅减少。
The recent crisis has also diminished belief in the judgment of the financial markets. The role of banks in the credit crunch and the cost of the financial sector bail-out has undermined the idea that the markets assess risk fairly and rationally. Instead, higher borrowing costs are seen as the result of unscrupulous speculation.
最近的危机也导致了对金融市场判断力的信任大幅降低了。借贷危机 中银行的角色,以及金融部门红利的开支已经破坏了认为市场风险评估是公正和理性的这个理念。取而代之的是将高额借贷的成本视为不道德的投机行为的结果。
The role of sovereign credit-default swaps (CDS), a way of betting on the likelihood of a country's failure to repay the money it has borrowed, has proved particularly controversial. Southern European nations, which have been at the heart of the recent market turmoil, have been quick to blame an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, brewed up by hedge funds, credit-rating agencies and even newspapers like this one, for unfairly pushing up their borrowing costs. The German government moved to ban short-selling of government bonds and some CDS transactions last month. As Charles Stanley, a stockbroking firm, cynically puts it, EU nations are saying: "Please fund our lifestyles, but don't hold us to any commitments."
独立的信贷违约掉期(一种打赌一个国家拖延支付其所借债务可能性 的方法。译注:详见http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-cn/%E4%BF%A1%E8%B2%B8%E9%81%95%E7%B4%84%E6%8E%89%E6%9C%9F)的角色尤其富有争 议。处于当前市场混乱核心的南欧国家已经很快的指责存在一个盎格鲁-撒克逊阴谋,其背后的对冲基金 与信用评级机构正在浮现出来,甚至报纸也喜欢报道这个不公平推高了他们借贷成本的阴谋。上个月,德国政府开始禁止卖空政府债券和部分信贷违约掉期交易。查 尔斯史丹利股票经纪公司冷冷的嘲讽此事,认为欧盟国家正在告诉市场:"请为我们的生活方式提供资金,但不要指望我们给出任何承诺。"
Why it matters
为什么出问题?
If a husband borrows money from his wife, the family is no worse off. By extension, just as every debt is a liability for the borrower, it is an asset for the creditor. Since Earth is not borrowing money from Mars, does the debt explosion really matter, or is it just an accounting device?
如果丈夫问妻子借钱,家庭情况不会恶化。延伸一下,正如每笔债务 对借款人来说都有归还的义务,对借出者来说就是资产。既然地球并未向火星借钱,帐务的膨胀真的是问题吗?抑或仅仅是一个会计记账问题?
During the credit boom of the early 1990s and 2000s the conventional view was that it did not matter. Not only were asset prices rising even faster than debt but the use of derivatives was spreading risk across the system and, in particular, away from the banks, which had capital ratios well above the regulatory minimum.
在20世 纪90年代和21世纪早期的帐务膨胀阶段, 普遍都认为这不是一个问题。不仅资产的价格上涨的速度远高于债务,而且金融衍生品的运用使得风险在金融系统中散布开,尤其使得风险远离银行,这就使银行的 资本比率远高于常规的最低值。
The problem with debt, though, is the need to repay it. Not for nothing does the word credit have its roots in the Latin word credere, to believe. If creditors lose faith in their borrowers, they will demand the repayment of existing debt or refuse to renew old loans. If the debt is secured against assets, then the borrower may be forced to sell. A lot of forced sales will cause asset prices to fall and make creditors even less willing to extend loans. If the asset price falls below the value of the loan, then both creditors and borrowers will lose money.
然而,债务的问题就是需要被偿还。单词"credit"的拉丁语词根不会白白的是"信任"。如果债权人对他们的债务人失去信任,他们将要求归还现存的债 务或者拒绝延期老的借款。如果债务是用资产担保的,那么借款人可能被迫出售资产。大量被迫出售的资产会导致价格下跌,而这就使得债权人更不愿意将债务延期 了。如果资产价格跌到所借款项金额之下,那么债务人与债权人都将损失金钱。
This is particularly troublesome if the economy slips into deflation, as happened globally in the 1930s and in Japan in the 1990s. Debt levels are fixed in nominal terms whereas asset prices can go up or down. So falling prices create a spiral in which assets are sold off to repay debts, triggering further price falls and further sales. Irving Fisher, an economist who worked in the first half of the 20th century, called this the debt deflation trap.
当经济滑向通货紧缩时,这就特别的麻烦了,就像发生在1930年代的全球性通货紧缩和1990年代日本的通 缩一样。债务水平在财务报表中是固定的,而资产价格却能上下波动。结果,不断急剧下降的价格造成要通过出售资产来还债,然后引起更大的价格下降与更多的资 产被出售。20世纪上半期的一个名为Irving Fisher的经济学家称这种现象为债务通缩陷阱。
Another reason why debt matters is to do with the role of banks in the economy. By their nature, banks borrow short (from depositors or the wholesale markets) and lend long. The business depends on confidence; no bank can survive if its depositors (or its wholesale lenders) all want their money back at once. If banks struggle to meet their own debts, they have no choice but to reduce their lending. If this happens on a large scale, as it did in the 1930s, the ripple effect for the economy as a whole can be devastating.
另一个造成债务成问题的原因与银行在经济中的角色有关。银行本质 上是短期借款(从储户或批发市场)而长期放贷。这样的业务依赖于信任;没有哪家银行在其所有储户(或者大出借人)要求其立刻还钱时还能够生存(译注:银行 若被挤兑则必死)。如果银行遇到自身的债务而抗争时,他们没有什么选择,只能降低放贷数量。如果这种情况在一个很大的规模上发生,比如象在1930年代那样,那么整个经济的连锁反应就必然是毁灭性的。
Both of these effects were seen in the debt crisis of 2007-08. Falling property prices caused defaults and a liquidity crisis in the banking system so severe that the authorities feared the cash machines would stop working. Hence the unprecedented largesse of the bank bail-out.
所有的这些后果在2007-08年 的债务危机中都出现了。资产价格的下滑导致了如此严重的债务拖欠与银行系统的清偿危机,以至于官方担心取款机将停止运行。结果,银行却支付了前所未有的巨 额奖金。
Hyman Minsky, an American economist who has become more fashionable since his death in 1996, argued that these debt crises were both inherent in the capitalist system and cyclical. Prosperous times encourage individuals and companies to take on more risk, meaning more debt. Initially such speculation is successful and encourages others to follow suit; eventually credit is extended to those who will be able to repay the debt only if asset prices keep rising (a succinct description of the subprime-lending boom). In the end the pyramid collapses.
Hyman Minsky,一位自从其1996年 过世后变得越来越流行的美国经济学家曾经争辩说,这些债务危机是资本主义制度与经济周期与生俱来的。经济繁荣时期就会鼓励个人与公司去冒更大的风险,也就 是更多的借债。起初,这样的投机是成功的,也鼓励了更多的人加入投机;最终,债务将达到只有资产价格保持继续上升时那些人才能够偿债的地步(简单的描述就 是:次级抵押贷款的繁荣)。最后,金字塔垮了。
In the aftermath of the latest collapse it is clear that the distinction between debt in the private and public sector has become blurred. If the private sector suffers, the public sector may be forced to step in and assume, or guarantee, the debt, as happened in 2008. Otherwise the economy may suffer a deep recession which will cut the tax revenues governments need to service their own debt.
很清楚,最近的这次崩溃的后果就是私营部门的债务与公共部门的债 务之间的区别变得模糊了。正如2008年所发生的事情一样,如果私营部门遭创,公共部门可能被迫涉 入并承担、或者担保债务。否则,经济将面临很深的衰退,这就将造成政府税收的减少,而政府需要这些税收收入来支付政府自身的债务。
If the Western world faces an era of austerity as debts are paid down, how will that affect day-to-day life? Clearly a society built on consumption will have to pay more attention to saving. The idea that using borrowed money to buy assets is the smart road to riches might lose currency, changing attitudes to home ownership as well as to parts of the finance sector such as private equity.
如果西方世界为了支付债务而面临一个节衣缩食的时代,那对现在的 日常生活将有何影响?显然,建立在消费之上的社会将不得不更多的关注储蓄。用借来的钱购买固定资产是成为富翁的聪明方法的观点可能不再流行,对于拥有房产 以及加入金融部门获得私人股份这些事情的态度也都发生了改变。
This special report will argue that, for the developed world, the debt-financed model has reached its limit. Most of the options for dealing with the debt overhang are unpalatable. As has already been seen in Greece and Ireland, each government will have to find its own way of reducing the burden. The battle between borrowers and creditors may be the defining struggle of the next generation.
这篇特别报导将要强调的是,对于发达国家,这个债务-金融模式已经到达了它的极限。大部分解决高悬的债务的方法都是苦涩的。正如已经在希腊和爱尔兰所看到的,每个 政府都将不得不寻找自己的方法去消减负担。这场在债务人与债权人之间的战争可能给下一代人定义了奋斗模式。
Orignal From: A special report on debt 特别报导:债务
2010年7月4日星期日
国际歌 中文版歌词(完整)
国际歌 中文版歌词(完整)
第一段:
起来,饥寒交迫的奴隶! 起来,全世界受苦的人!
满腔的热血已经沸腾,要为真理而斗争!
旧世界打个落花流水,奴隶们起来,起来!
不要说我们一无所有,我们要做天下的主人!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第二段:
从来就没有什么救世主,也不靠神仙皇帝!
要创造人类的幸福,全靠我们自己!
我们要夺回劳动果实,让思想冲破牢笼!
快把那炉火烧得通红,趁热打铁才会成功!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第三段:
压迫的国家、空洞的法律,
苛捐杂税榨穷苦;
富人无务独逍遥。
穷人的权利只是空话,
受够了护佑下的沉沦。
平等需要新的法律,
没有无义务的权利,
平等!也没有无权利的义务!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第四段:
矿井和铁路的帝王,
在神坛上奇丑无比。
他们除了劳动,
还抢夺过什么呢?
在他们的保险箱里,
劳动的创造一无所有!
从剥削者的手里,
他们只是讨回血债。
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第五段:
国王用和谐的烟雾来迷惑我们,
我们要联合向暴君开战。
让战士们在军队里罢工,
停止镇压,离开暴力机器。
如果他们坚持护卫敌人,
让我们英勇牺牲;
他们将会知道我们的子弹,
会射向我们自己的将军。
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第六段:
是谁创造了人类世界?是我们劳动群众!
一切归劳动者所有,哪能容得寄生虫?!
最可恨那些喝血的毒蛇猛兽,吃尽了我们的血肉!
一旦将它们消灭干净,鲜红的太阳照遍全球!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
Orignal From: 国际歌 中文版歌词(完整)
第一段:
起来,饥寒交迫的奴隶! 起来,全世界受苦的人!
满腔的热血已经沸腾,要为真理而斗争!
旧世界打个落花流水,奴隶们起来,起来!
不要说我们一无所有,我们要做天下的主人!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第二段:
从来就没有什么救世主,也不靠神仙皇帝!
要创造人类的幸福,全靠我们自己!
我们要夺回劳动果实,让思想冲破牢笼!
快把那炉火烧得通红,趁热打铁才会成功!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第三段:
压迫的国家、空洞的法律,
苛捐杂税榨穷苦;
富人无务独逍遥。
穷人的权利只是空话,
受够了护佑下的沉沦。
平等需要新的法律,
没有无义务的权利,
平等!也没有无权利的义务!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第四段:
矿井和铁路的帝王,
在神坛上奇丑无比。
他们除了劳动,
还抢夺过什么呢?
在他们的保险箱里,
劳动的创造一无所有!
从剥削者的手里,
他们只是讨回血债。
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第五段:
国王用和谐的烟雾来迷惑我们,
我们要联合向暴君开战。
让战士们在军队里罢工,
停止镇压,离开暴力机器。
如果他们坚持护卫敌人,
让我们英勇牺牲;
他们将会知道我们的子弹,
会射向我们自己的将军。
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
第六段:
是谁创造了人类世界?是我们劳动群众!
一切归劳动者所有,哪能容得寄生虫?!
最可恨那些喝血的毒蛇猛兽,吃尽了我们的血肉!
一旦将它们消灭干净,鲜红的太阳照遍全球!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
这是最后的斗争,团结起来到明天,
英特纳雄耐尔就一定要实现!
Orignal From: 国际歌 中文版歌词(完整)
2010年7月1日星期四
Russia and its neighbourhood 俄罗斯和它的邻居(们)
原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/16438707?story_id=16438707
Russia's empty empire
俄罗斯的空虚帝国
Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions founder on the rocks of reality
俄罗斯新帝国主义的野心撞到了现实这块大岩石
Jun 24th 2010
2010年6月24日
SO MUCH for Russia’s “zone of privileged interests” and the West’s worries about it. The phrase was coined by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, in the aftermath of the 2008 war with Georgia, when Russian rhetoric reached shrill levels. The events of the past two weeks in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan have provided a humble reality check and exposed the hollowness of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions among the states that once made up the Soviet Union.
俄罗斯非常关心它的“具有特权的地区”“优先利益地区”以 及西方对这种关切的担心。当俄罗斯就2008年与格鲁吉亚的战争结果尖锐的辩解时,俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫创造了这个短语。过去两周在白俄罗斯和吉尔吉斯坦 之间发生的事件,已经可以提供一个初步的现实测试,并展示了俄罗 斯新帝国主义野心与前苏联加盟共和国间的巨大差异。暴露了俄罗斯的新帝国主义野心在这些前苏联加盟共和国的空洞无力。
Russiahas long wished to keep the West away from its backyard. Now that America and the EU are tied up with their own problems, Russia has had its wish partly granted. Left to its own devices, however, it has shown little leadership, vision or sense of imperial responsibility in its vaunted “zone”.
俄罗斯长期以来一直希望西方远离它的后院。现在,美国和欧盟都被他们自身的问题所束缚,俄罗斯部分的实现了它的愿望。然而,由于它自身的策略硬件条件,在它自夸的“传统区域”,俄罗斯几乎没有显示出 领导力、远景和帝国的责任感。
A spat over gas with Belarus has exposed the fragility of the embryonic customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, put forward by Moscow as the nucleus of a new Russia-dominated economic club. The bloody pogroms in Kyrgyzstan (seearticle)revealthe Collective Security Treaty Organisation—a post-Soviet military alliance of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia—to be a chimera.
莫斯科提议,在俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯之间建立一个由俄罗斯控制的经济俱乐部,而这个刚刚萌芽的关税联盟在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯就天然气问题发生 口角时就已经暴露了它的脆弱。由俄罗斯、吉尔吉斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、白俄罗斯和美国成立的、名为集体安全条约国组织的前苏联后苏联军事联盟,在发生了吉尔吉斯坦的血腥屠杀后,显示 了这样的组织不过是个幻象。
Related items
相关条目
* Kyrgyzstan's humanitarian crisis: Sad homecomingJun 24th 2010
* 关于吉尔吉斯坦人权的危机:悲伤的返乡(http://www.economist.com/node/16439195)
In its dispute with Belarus this week Russia started to cut gas supplies to its supposed close ally, claiming it was owed some $200m. The debt stems from Belarus’s decision to pay last year’s price of $150 per thousand cubic metres of gas, ignoring a Gazprom price increase. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Belarus’s maverick leader, upped the stakes by ordering a cut in transit shipments of Russian gas to the EU, arguing it was also owed money. On June 24th Gazprom resumed full supply but Belarus maintained its claim.
在本周与白俄罗斯的争吵后,俄罗斯开始切断它假象中的亲密同盟者的天然气供应,并声称白俄罗斯拖欠了它两亿美元的款项。这笔债务起源于白俄罗斯不顾 俄罗斯天然气公司已经涨价的事实,决定按照去年每千立方米150美元的价格支付俄罗斯。卢卡申科,白俄罗斯喜欢标新立异的领导人,提高了从俄罗斯向欧盟供 气的传输费用以要求一个折扣价格,并争辩说白俄罗斯也被拖欠了款项。6月24日,俄罗斯天然气公司恢复了对白俄罗斯的全部供应,但是白俄罗斯依然坚持它的 主张。
This is not the first spat between Russia and Belarus, and it will not be the last. But, as Fyodor Lukyanov, the Russia editor forGlobal Affairs, argues, this time the row has a political flavour. For all his authoritarianism and anti-Americanism, Mr Lukashenka is disdained by Russian officials for reneging on his promises and dragging his feet on agreements. He has skilfully managed to extract large subsidies from Russia while poking it in the eye and playing it off against the EU.
这不是发生在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯之间的第一次口角,也不会是最后一次。不过,按照俄罗斯《全球事务》编辑Lukyanov的看法,此次争吵有一种政治 特性。由于他的独裁主义与反美主义,卢卡申科因为违背他的承诺并践踏协议而被俄罗斯官方所鄙视。他曾经非常巧妙的通过反对欧盟而获取俄罗斯大笔的补助。
Last year the Belarusian president refused to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway Georgian territories over which Russia had warred with Georgia. That was followed by a Russian ban on Belarus’s milk products. More recently, Mr Lukashenka has decided to shelter Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the overthrown authoritarian leader of Kyrgyzstan, who is loathed by Moscow.
去年,白俄罗斯总统拒绝承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹的独立,而 此时俄罗斯正为而当时俄罗斯却为这两个格鲁吉亚的分离地区与格发生了战斗。紧接着,俄罗斯禁止了白俄罗斯的奶制品。最近,卢卡申科又 决定庇护被莫斯科憎恨的吉尔吉斯坦的被推翻的独裁者巴基耶夫。
Mr Lukashenka has also sabotaged the customs union with Kazakhstan and Russia, demanding that Russia scrap its export duty on oil and oil products, which would allow Belarus to buy them at Russia’s domestic prices and to re-export them at a profit. (Russia wants to keep oil out of the union for now.) Russia’s response is to reach for its favourite weapon: the gas taps.
卢卡申科要求俄罗斯放弃石油及石油制品的出口关税,以便白俄罗斯能够以俄罗斯的国内价格购买石油及石油产品,并能够出口获利,而这将破坏哈萨克斯坦 与俄罗斯之间的关税联盟。(而现在,俄罗斯想要将石油排除在这个关税联盟之外)。俄罗斯的反应就是拿出了它最喜爱的武器:天然气敲打对白俄罗斯的天然气龙头(译注:即消减天然 气供应或者提高价格等手段)。
In its relations with its neighbours, Russia has mostly relied on coercion. Consider its response to Mr Bakiyev’s fall and the subsequent pogroms in Kyrgyzstan. The Kremlin shed no tears for Mr Bakiyev, whom it saw as two-faced and greedy. Last year Mr Bakiyev extracted a $2 billion aid package from Russia in exchange for a promise to close an American military air base in Kyrgyzstan, as Russia insisted. He then raised the rent for the American base and allowed it to stay.
俄罗斯常常依靠强力手段来处理它与其邻居们的关系。考虑一下俄罗斯对巴基耶夫的倒台和紧接着发生在吉尔吉斯坦的大屠杀的反应。克里姆林宫对巴基耶夫 毫无同情,而后者被前者视为贪婪的两面派。去年,巴基耶夫从俄罗斯获得了20亿美元的援助,作为交换,他答应关闭俄罗斯一直要求关闭的美国在吉尔吉斯坦的 空军基地。然后,他提高了美军基地的租金并允许其继续待下去。
Solve your own problems
解决你自己的问题
When, earlier this month, the Kyrgyz clashed with the Uzbek minority in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh and the interim government appealed to Russia for military help, the Kremlin stood back. To the outside world it looked like the opportunity Russia had been waiting for to show that it dominates its backyard. To Russia it was a nightmare that evoked memories of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Russia’s official line was that it could not interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs (a statement that sat oddly with Russia’s war against Georgia).
这个月的早些时候,当吉尔吉斯坦在其南部城市Osh与乌兹别克少数民族发生冲突时,临时政府向俄罗斯寻求军事援助,然而克里姆林宫却袖手旁观。对外 界来说,这看上去好像是俄罗斯一直在等待的显示其控制其后院能力的机会。但对俄罗斯来说,这却唤起了80年代苏联卷入阿富汗的噩梦般的会议。俄罗斯官方声 明,它不会干预吉尔吉斯坦的国内事务(一个与俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚却发生战争的声明形成奇怪的对照)。
In fact, Russia has neither the capacity nor the will for such intervention. As Alexander Golts, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, argues, the Russian army—which largely consists of unskilled recruits and is plagued by bullying—is not equipped for the sort of peacekeeping operation they were asked to carry out in Kyrgyzstan. Besides, Russia’s “allies” in the CSTO, particularly nearby Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have no desire to see Russian troops setting a precedent by sorting out the internal affairs of a neighbouring state.
事实上,俄罗斯既没有能力也没有愿望干预此类事件。正如俄罗斯武装力量的研究专家Glot主张的,由大量没有经验、并被恐惧所影响的新兵所组成的俄罗斯军队由大量没有经验的新兵组 成,并蔓延着虐待新兵这种瘟疫行为的俄罗斯军队,并没有准备好去执行吉尔吉斯坦要求的和平行动。另外,俄罗斯在CSTO(集体安全条约国组 织)中的盟友,特别是其近邻乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦,都不愿意看到俄罗斯军队为解决周边国家的内部事务而出兵成为一个惯例。
Russia’s intervention would be unpopular at home too. Xenophobia towards migrant workers from Central Asia and memories of Afghanistan would make any sacrifice of Russian lives in Kyrgyzstan unacceptable to most Russians. Yet, if Russia was right not to send troops to Kyrgyzstan, it was wrong to claim the country as part of a zone of privileged Russian interest.
俄罗斯的干预在其国内也将不会是经常性的是不受欢迎的。 针对来自中亚移民雇工的排外主义和对阿富汗侵略的记忆,对大部分俄罗斯人来说,在吉尔吉斯坦的俄罗斯民众的任何牺牲都是不可接受的。然而,如果俄罗斯不派 遣军队到吉尔吉斯坦是正确的,那么再声明这个国家是俄罗斯特殊利益地区的一部分就是错误的了(译注:也就是说俄罗斯既然不派遣军队协助吉尔吉斯坦解决国内 问题,那么俄罗斯也就无权宣布吉尔吉斯坦是其特殊利益地区)
When ethnic clashes broke out in Osh 20 years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev sent in Soviet troops. Today’s government, for all its Soviet nostalgia, seems to feel no such obligation. What Russia’s response to Kyrgyzstan has made clear, Mr Golts observes, is that “Moscow bosses imitate imperial ambitions in the same way they imitate democracy.”
20年前,当种族冲突发生在Osh时,戈尔巴乔夫派出了苏联军队。今天,那些对前苏联怀旧的政府官员似乎没有感到有这个(出兵)的责任。Golts 先生观察到,俄罗斯对吉尔吉斯坦的反应很清楚了,那就是“莫斯科的老爷们模仿帝国的野心与他们模仿民主的方式是一样的”。
Russia's empty empire
俄罗斯的空虚帝国
Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions founder on the rocks of reality
俄罗斯新帝国主义的野心撞到了现实这块大岩石
Jun 24th 2010
2010年6月24日
SO MUCH for Russia’s “zone of privileged interests” and the West’s worries about it. The phrase was coined by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, in the aftermath of the 2008 war with Georgia, when Russian rhetoric reached shrill levels. The events of the past two weeks in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan have provided a humble reality check and exposed the hollowness of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions among the states that once made up the Soviet Union.
俄罗斯非常关心它的
Russiahas long wished to keep the West away from its backyard. Now that America and the EU are tied up with their own problems, Russia has had its wish partly granted. Left to its own devices, however, it has shown little leadership, vision or sense of imperial responsibility in its vaunted “zone”.
俄罗斯长期以来一直希望西方远离它的后院。现在,美国和欧盟都被他们自身的问题所束缚,俄罗斯部分的实现了它的愿望。然而,由于它自身的
A spat over gas with Belarus has exposed the fragility of the embryonic customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, put forward by Moscow as the nucleus of a new Russia-dominated economic club. The bloody pogroms in Kyrgyzstan (seearticle)revealthe Collective Security Treaty Organisation—a post-Soviet military alliance of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia—to be a chimera.
莫斯科提议,在俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯之间建立一个由俄罗斯控制的经济俱乐部,而这个刚刚萌芽的关税联盟在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯就天然气问题发生 口角时就已经暴露了它的脆弱。由俄罗斯、吉尔吉斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、白俄罗斯和美国成立的、名为集体安全条约国组织的
Related items
相关条目
* Kyrgyzstan's humanitarian crisis: Sad homecomingJun 24th 2010
* 关于吉尔吉斯坦人权的危机:悲伤的返乡(http://www.economist.com/node/16439195)
In its dispute with Belarus this week Russia started to cut gas supplies to its supposed close ally, claiming it was owed some $200m. The debt stems from Belarus’s decision to pay last year’s price of $150 per thousand cubic metres of gas, ignoring a Gazprom price increase. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Belarus’s maverick leader, upped the stakes by ordering a cut in transit shipments of Russian gas to the EU, arguing it was also owed money. On June 24th Gazprom resumed full supply but Belarus maintained its claim.
在本周与白俄罗斯的争吵后,俄罗斯开始切断它假象中的亲密同盟者的天然气供应,并声称白俄罗斯拖欠了它两亿美元的款项。这笔债务起源于白俄罗斯不顾 俄罗斯天然气公司已经涨价的事实,决定按照去年每千立方米150美元的价格支付俄罗斯。卢卡申科,白俄罗斯喜欢标新立异的领导人,提高了从俄罗斯向欧盟供 气的传输费用以要求一个折扣价格,并争辩说白俄罗斯也被拖欠了款项。6月24日,俄罗斯天然气公司恢复了对白俄罗斯的全部供应,但是白俄罗斯依然坚持它的 主张。
This is not the first spat between Russia and Belarus, and it will not be the last. But, as Fyodor Lukyanov, the Russia editor forGlobal Affairs, argues, this time the row has a political flavour. For all his authoritarianism and anti-Americanism, Mr Lukashenka is disdained by Russian officials for reneging on his promises and dragging his feet on agreements. He has skilfully managed to extract large subsidies from Russia while poking it in the eye and playing it off against the EU.
这不是发生在俄罗斯与白俄罗斯之间的第一次口角,也不会是最后一次。不过,按照俄罗斯《全球事务》编辑Lukyanov的看法,此次争吵有一种政治 特性。由于他的独裁主义与反美主义,卢卡申科因为违背他的承诺并践踏协议而被俄罗斯官方所鄙视。他曾经非常巧妙的通过反对欧盟而获取俄罗斯大笔的补助。
Last year the Belarusian president refused to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway Georgian territories over which Russia had warred with Georgia. That was followed by a Russian ban on Belarus’s milk products. More recently, Mr Lukashenka has decided to shelter Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the overthrown authoritarian leader of Kyrgyzstan, who is loathed by Moscow.
去年,白俄罗斯总统拒绝承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹的独立,
Mr Lukashenka has also sabotaged the customs union with Kazakhstan and Russia, demanding that Russia scrap its export duty on oil and oil products, which would allow Belarus to buy them at Russia’s domestic prices and to re-export them at a profit. (Russia wants to keep oil out of the union for now.) Russia’s response is to reach for its favourite weapon: the gas taps.
卢卡申科要求俄罗斯放弃石油及石油制品的出口关税,以便白俄罗斯能够以俄罗斯的国内价格购买石油及石油产品,并能够出口获利,而这将破坏哈萨克斯坦 与俄罗斯之间的关税联盟。(而现在,俄罗斯想要将石油排除在这个关税联盟之外)。俄罗斯的反应就是拿出了它最喜爱的武器:
In its relations with its neighbours, Russia has mostly relied on coercion. Consider its response to Mr Bakiyev’s fall and the subsequent pogroms in Kyrgyzstan. The Kremlin shed no tears for Mr Bakiyev, whom it saw as two-faced and greedy. Last year Mr Bakiyev extracted a $2 billion aid package from Russia in exchange for a promise to close an American military air base in Kyrgyzstan, as Russia insisted. He then raised the rent for the American base and allowed it to stay.
俄罗斯常常依靠强力手段来处理它与其邻居们的关系。考虑一下俄罗斯对巴基耶夫的倒台和紧接着发生在吉尔吉斯坦的大屠杀的反应。克里姆林宫对巴基耶夫 毫无同情,而后者被前者视为贪婪的两面派。去年,巴基耶夫从俄罗斯获得了20亿美元的援助,作为交换,他答应关闭俄罗斯一直要求关闭的美国在吉尔吉斯坦的 空军基地。然后,他提高了美军基地的租金并允许其继续待下去。
Solve your own problems
解决你自己的问题
When, earlier this month, the Kyrgyz clashed with the Uzbek minority in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh and the interim government appealed to Russia for military help, the Kremlin stood back. To the outside world it looked like the opportunity Russia had been waiting for to show that it dominates its backyard. To Russia it was a nightmare that evoked memories of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Russia’s official line was that it could not interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs (a statement that sat oddly with Russia’s war against Georgia).
这个月的早些时候,当吉尔吉斯坦在其南部城市Osh与乌兹别克少数民族发生冲突时,临时政府向俄罗斯寻求军事援助,然而克里姆林宫却袖手旁观。对外 界来说,这看上去好像是俄罗斯一直在等待的显示其控制其后院能力的机会。但对俄罗斯来说,这却唤起了80年代苏联卷入阿富汗的噩梦般的会议。俄罗斯官方声 明,它不会干预吉尔吉斯坦的国内事务(一个与俄罗斯和格鲁吉亚却发生战争的声明形成奇怪的对照)。
In fact, Russia has neither the capacity nor the will for such intervention. As Alexander Golts, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, argues, the Russian army—which largely consists of unskilled recruits and is plagued by bullying—is not equipped for the sort of peacekeeping operation they were asked to carry out in Kyrgyzstan. Besides, Russia’s “allies” in the CSTO, particularly nearby Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have no desire to see Russian troops setting a precedent by sorting out the internal affairs of a neighbouring state.
事实上,俄罗斯既没有能力也没有愿望干预此类事件。正如俄罗斯武装力量的研究专家Glot主张的,
Russia’s intervention would be unpopular at home too. Xenophobia towards migrant workers from Central Asia and memories of Afghanistan would make any sacrifice of Russian lives in Kyrgyzstan unacceptable to most Russians. Yet, if Russia was right not to send troops to Kyrgyzstan, it was wrong to claim the country as part of a zone of privileged Russian interest.
俄罗斯的干预在其国内也将
When ethnic clashes broke out in Osh 20 years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev sent in Soviet troops. Today’s government, for all its Soviet nostalgia, seems to feel no such obligation. What Russia’s response to Kyrgyzstan has made clear, Mr Golts observes, is that “Moscow bosses imitate imperial ambitions in the same way they imitate democracy.”
20年前,当种族冲突发生在Osh时,戈尔巴乔夫派出了苏联军队。今天,那些对前苏联怀旧的政府官员似乎没有感到有这个(出兵)的责任。Golts 先生观察到,俄罗斯对吉尔吉斯坦的反应很清楚了,那就是“莫斯科的老爷们模仿帝国的野心与他们模仿民主的方式是一样的”。
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